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Social Welfare in the Emerging World Culture*  
 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
 
Introduction 
It is a widely shared view in the United States today that we are 
witnessed the sunset of the Atlantic age, with the declining world influence 
of the communities of the Atlantic rim, and  the dawn of a new Pacific age.   
Such an historic shift is one of many taking place in the world today with 
important implications for social welfare.  One of the most dramatic impacts 
of the new Pacific age upon the United States has been the recent upsurge of 
immigration, which has nearly reached the all-time high of European 
immigration in the early 1900's.1 (Washington Post Weekly, 1988, 31.)   
The bi-polar political division of the world since 1945 has obscured the 
emergence of other, completely new cultural unities and possibilities arising 
on the heels of developments in communications and transportation 
technology.  In the age when even the American and European right appear 
willing to accept the spirit of glasnost  and perestroika, it appears appropriate 
to address some of those implications and possibilities. 
The extraordinary events of 1989 throughout Eastern Europe, as well as 
world reaction to the tragic events in Tian An Meng Square are further 
evidence of the essential correctness of the political convergence thesis which 
argues that capitalist and socialist economies are slowly adopting one 
another's best features and converging toward a new common mean.  My 
hope is that, whatever turns these social developments take, the humanistic 
values upon which social science and social work were founded will be 
important components of that future. 
Welfare Values 
This paper, like social work itself, is an exercise in normative, value-based 
rather than purely objective social science.   Not only is this a paper with 
values, it is also a paper about values.  Some might even call it an exercise in 
utopian thinking.  The paper argues for the emergence of a world-wide 
universal pluralistic culture, in which a common core of humanitarian values 
will eventually be institutionalized in the major institutions of each society in 
ways which are consistent with the unique historical, cultural, economic and 
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political context of that society.    It is this process of adaptation of universal, 
or at least trans-cultural, values to the unique circumstances of individual 
cultures which can be called "indigenization".  
For purposes of this paper, I assume, without attempting to identify them 
in full, that there are a cluster of distinctive beliefs and values that can be 
termed "welfare values".  Welfare values are found in many, if not all, of the 
contemporary societies of the world today.   Among these values are a belief 
in the inherent dignity of human life; commitment to human rights and 
personal freedom; commitment to personal and social development; concern 
for improving the condition of the poor and disadvantaged; a general desire 
to diminish pain and suffering; and tolerance of individual and group 
diversity. 
While I am certainly not naive enough to suggest that societies and 
governments everywhere currently operate on the basis of these values, I do 
wish to suggest that there is a growing community of nations devoted to their 
observance, and that in the international community major departures from 
these values are matters of world concern. 
It is generally accepted that many of these values arose out of the Jewish, 
Christian and Moslem religious traditions; that they were secularized into 
the "humanism" and "humanitarianism" of Western Europe in the 
Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment; that they have been widely 
disseminated throughout the world in the 19th and 20th centuries; and that 
institutionalization of these values in government constitutes what we term a 
welfare state.2 That there is great institutional variation in welfare states, 
each of which has adapted to the unique demands and constraints of an 
indigenous political culture is easy to confirm. 
 If this is so, it is likely that distinctive subsets of welfare values, some 
of which have yet to be identified as such, undergird the social welfare 
institutions growing up independently outside the West.  The meritocratic 
recruitment procedures of Confucian bureaucracy, for example, perhaps 
should be seen as a successful case of the long-term practice of opportunity 
theory in human history.3  Likewise, what might be called mental health 
values of contemplation borrowed from Buddhism (and no doubt markedly  
transformed in the process) , and the "holistic health" values borrowed from 
oriental medicine have recently had much impact on American health care 
practice.   It is important that the international social welfare community 
begin to identify and recognize these values for what they are. 
 The world-wide dissemination of these and other welfare values--in 
such highly diverse forms as multinational efforts in the face of drought and 
other natural disasters, abhorrence to abuse of political prisoners,  and  
international support for literacy--are components of what appears now to be 
the long-term emergence of a world culture, or terraculture.  In the west, we 
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have spoken of "mankind" and "the human community" at least since the 
Enlightenment, even when the term really applied only to white European 
males.   In the future, the notion of a culturally, if not politically, unified 
human community appears likely to become more than a vague abstraction.   
  The emergence of a single, uniform world culture incorporating 
welfare values would be one of the truly momentous events in human 
history, fully comparable with the agricultural, urban and industrial 
revolutions.   We are still far from such an occurrence.  However, throughout 
much of the current century, and particularly since 1945, we have seen the 
global spread of increasingly familiar international cultural patterns. 
    The processes of change which have occurred in the world during the 
past four decades are multiple and complex, and a full analysis of these 
changes would be a daunting task.   However, we can easily note some of the 
most obvious changes:   the end of the vast European colonial empires in 
Africa and Asia, together with the growth of airport, skyscraper and 
shantytown urbanism in virtually every major city on earth, the collapse of 
an enormous number of traditional cultures and ways of life together with an 
almost universal embrace of mass consumer culture; astonishing advances in 
transportation and communication, including most recently electronic 
computing, which have brought virtually every surviving human culture into 
proximity with all others in an unprecedented juxtaposition which gives 
entirely new meaning to the term cultural pluralism. 
What, in this brave new world of Coke, Pan Am, IBM, Sony and Hyundai, 
is the proper place for universal welfare values and what is the proper role 
for the distinctiveness and traditions of nations, cultures and subcultures?   
The issue is certainly a cause for concern for thoughtful persons everywhere.  
Because of the sensitivity of social problems and social problem-solving 
techniques to cultural and subcultural influence, the issue is also a major one 
for the internationalization of social work practice.  It is in this context that 
the interplay between universal values and indigenous cultures, which is the 
theme of this conference, takes on its greatest importance for us. 
Indigenization 
The term indigenization is used here in contrast with homogenization or 
blending, as the cultural process most likely to impact upon social welfare 
values and ideals in the short-term future.  It has already been clearly 
established that culture contact does not lead directly to homogeneity 
(sameness).  For example, after three centuries of African, European and 
Asian immigration to the United States where the idea of the "melting pot" 
originated, major ethnic and subcultural diversities remain.  It is likely that 
contact between stable, non-immigrant cultures may contribute instead to 
cultural diversity and pluralism, political pluralism and a gradual, long term 
adjustment process as established truths and cherished folkways and mores 
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from each culture are fitted to new circumstances and other different, but 
similarly deep beliefs and values. 
Such adjustments has always been part of the immigrant experience.  
What is different about the world today is that the marvels of transportation 
and communications are imposing the same requirements for adaptation and 
adjustment on those who stayed at home as well.  We can call this process  
indigenization:  In its intercultural aspect, it is the peaceful adjustment of 
separate, stable, territorially located cultures to one another via 
international trade, transportation, communication, and other avenues of 
diffusion.  In the late twentieth century, this process is already far enough 
along that one might be brash enough to speak of an emerging world order or 
"terraculture". 
The Emerging Terraculture 
   The term terraculture was chosen here because it appears that this 
emerging cultural order is very rapidly being embraced by the majority of the 
entire earth's population.  Although many aspects of post-industrialization 
have been criticized by cultural high-brows, romantics and latter day 
Jeremiahs, the onslaught of prefabricated clothing, refrigerators and 
appliances, automobiles, electricity, radio, television, pop culture and other 
"consumer goods" which characterize and mark the advance of this revolution 
is universally and warmly embraced by peoples everywhere.   From a social 
welfare standpoint, many of these developments (such as refrigeration) have 
also brought with them major improvements in public health and social 
welfare. 
 The story today is much the same everywhere:  Formerly rural, 
isolated peoples regret deeply the loss of traditional ways of life and fear for 
the loss of cherished cultural heritages of beliefs, rituals, ceremonies and 
other folkways.  However, they are also unwilling to abandon pickup trucks, 
indoor plumbing, electricity and refrigeration and other accoutrements of 
"modern" life and return to the old ways.   This is as true in rural Appalachia 
as it is in Nigeria or rural Korea. 
The force of tradition in a given culture may not always go gently into the 
night -- as anti-modernist movements as diverse as the English Luddites, the 
European Counter-Reformation, the Iranian Revolution,  Quebec 
Nationalism, the American Indian Movement, the Northern Irish,  Basques,  
Kurds,  Sikhs, and American evangelical Christians attest.  There even are 
cases of successful long-term holdouts against modernization, such as the 
Shakers, Amish and Mennonites, and the Navaho in America, for example.    
There would appear to be no cases in the world today of major cultures which 
have completely and successfully turned their backs on modernization for 
any length of time, however. 
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   Cultural diffusion always occurs unevenly.  In every contemporary 
culture today, one could find locals, people whose entire world view is 
internal to culture and community and whose concern for "the rest of the 
world" is slight.  Each of us--Japanese, Korean and American--has had our 
own native traditions of isolationism and xenophobia (fear of strangers). In 
many, perhaps all cultures, one also finds the cosmopolitans, cultural natives 
with an interest in, curiosity about, and knowledge of the outside world with 
its great cultural variety and many options. 
   In America, missionaries, anthropologists, journalists, diplomats and 
"internationalists" -- persons from all walks of life with an interest in and 
curiosity about the world have been among the key cosmopolitans.  Since 
1940, those performing national military service have emerged as one of the 
largest and most varied groups of American cosmopolitans, because of the 
extensive system of American military installations outside the U.S.   More 
recently, American businessmen -- long an important bastion of isolationism  
-- have emerged as a key class of contemporary cosmopolitans. 
 The challenge for internationally minded persons in every society is how 
to assure that universal welfare values are supported and advanced in the 
emerging world culture, without falling into the well-known traps of 
ethnocentrism.  Although this may be a formidable challenge, it is not 
entirely without precedent.  In some respects, the task is not unlike that 
faced by social reformers in New York or Chicago in the early 1900's, when 
dozens of different ethnic, racial and language groups often lived on the same 
city blocks.   It was in this environment that the social work commitments to 
respect for individual differences and personal uniqueness were first forged. 
Today, the challenge for social work internationally is to translate those 
same approaches and that same sensitivity into international contexts. What 
may be needed today is the functional equivalent of the settlement house.  It 
will be truly unfortunate if social work remains what it all too often is today: 
A simple transfer of American methods to different cultural contexts.  A far 
more productive strategy would be to pursue a vigorous program of 
indigenization of social work: to begin at the level of basic universal values 
and to develop social technologies appropriate to the unique time and place 
characteristics of individual cultures. 
Yet how is this to be done?  One major starting point would involve a 
research program of vast proportions: the identification of those elements in 
each culture which contribute to social welfare values and to an assessment 
of the likelihood of success in applying those values in other contexts.  Harry 
Stack Sullivan proposed just such an undertaking more than 50 years ago, 
and certainly the knowledge of fields such as philosophy, anthropology and 
history will be very helpful in such an enterprise.4    This is precisely the 
kind of study my colleagues, Sung Lai Boo and John Peters, have undertaken 
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in their examination of the contemporary social welfare implications of the 
traditional Korean concepts of Hyangyak  and Ture .5 
A second major project might involve the promotion of special forms of 
cross-cultural education, in which the welfare values and practices of one 
society are systematically introduced to citizens of another.  Certainly, this is 
what the American missionaries attempted on a world-wide scale during the 
19th century with the introduction of orphanages and schools.  In the world 
of social work practice, such  social change activity probably would be placed 
somewhere between contemporary social development planning and 
education. Let us not forget, however, that in the world of the emerging 
terraculture, advertising, marketing and mass communications strategies 
probably also have a role to play in such ventures.  
Because some welfare values have already been so widely disseminated in 
the world, we now  already observe the ways in which this indefinite core or 
what we might term universal humanitarianism are being adapted to the 
unique needs of individual societies and states. The political use of the 
welfare state by the conservative and liberal parties of Great Britain, for 
example, as a tool in the class conflict gives special meaning to the concept of  
"universal services" as it is used there.   Likewise, in the United States, 
which has a long legacy of commitment to the application of scientific 
management concepts to social welfare administration, the symbolic 
importance of "efficiency" takes on an importance in welfare policy debates 
which many non-Americans find difficult to understand. 
Welfare States 
One of the issues which requires some examination in light of the 
phenomenon of post-modern conservatism in Great Britain, France, the 
United States, Canada, and elsewhere is our continued allegiance to the 
concept of the universal welfare state as the preferred provider of all major 
services as well as income maintenance programs. 
In general, social workers and some sociologists tend to use the term 
welfare state to refer only to public, tax-supported transfer programs of social 
insurance, social assistance and social services.  By contrast, political 
scientists and economists tend to extend the term "welfare state" to also 
include many forms of regulatory activity, such as workers compensation or 
agricultural subsidy payments as well as transfer payments and public 
services.  This latter approach gets very close to the distinction Richard 
Titmuss made between fiscal, occupational and social welfare. 
Highly important for modern welfare state theory and the process of 
indigenization is the distinction between several types of modern states in 
relation to the people being governed. 
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On this dimension, there are the states, like Japan and South Korea, and 
many of the states of 19th century Europe, where the people are a single 
racial, cultural and language group.  In such cases, those who control the 
welfare state and those who benefit from it are members of a common 
community.  In one way or another, the struggle for adoption of social welfare 
policy and the building of social welfare institutions in these societies is a 
community development effort and can be grounded in the mutuality, unity 
and fellow-feeling of the people. 
By contrast, there are bi-cultural states, like South Africa, Israel, or the 
United States before desegregation, where the population is divided into two 
distinct (and antagonistic) groups, one of whom controls the state apparatus, 
to the disadvantage of the other.  In this case, the prospects of a universal 
welfare state with uniform coverage seems highly unlikely, and the problem 
of institution building is particularly difficult for the group out of power.   
The dominant group, of course, has a definite advantage in its control of the 
state, while welfare state institutions for the submissive group are either 
distinctly inferior or built indigenously outside the state without its obvious 
advantages of financing and social control. 
Finally, there are the pluralistic states like the contemporary United 
States, the Soviet Union, China,  the states of western Europe,  and many of 
the emergent states of post-colonial Africa.   Welfare institutions in these 
cases must either be group-specific or grounded in universal values with 
considerable political cogency, such as Anglo-American "natural rights" or 
the French "universal rights of man".  The political problem faced by welfare 
proponents in these societies--even when they are in the majority--is whether 
appeals to such universal values can be made sufficiently powerful and 
convincing to overcome traditional ethnic, tribal, racial and other cleavages.   
Far too often in the past the answer has been negative.   The American 
struggle with racism, which has been ongoing for more than 100 years, offers 
a sobering example of the difficulties involved. 
From a world perspective, the problem of welfare in any world culture 
which emerges in the future, is not unlike that of the pluralist states, and the 
problems of the unitary states are not unlike the problems of distinct ethnic 
communities within those states. 
Beyond The Welfare State 
Each nation state which has embraced all or part of the welfare state 
ideal has done so in its own way, and in light of its own unique history.  
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and other European welfare states have, in 
fact been slowly building welfare institutions on the foundations of the past 
for at least 500 years.  In the United States the legacy of constitution, rugged 
individualism, federalism and social darwinism have created what is 
sometimes referred to as the "reluctant welfare state"  committed to 
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gradualism and disjointed incrementalism in policy development, and also 
committed to the pluralism of coexisting public, nonprofit and commercial 
institutions. 
In discussing welfare in international context, we should not continue to 
be preoccupied exclusively with the state.  Certainly, the coercive powers of 
the modern state are formidable weapons in dealing with social problems 
such as family violence, economic exploitation, and dependency.    Likewise, 
the ability of the democratic welfare states to peacefully redirect portions of 
the surplus production of their economies without undermining productive 
enterprise is still one of the strongest weapons available against the historic 
scourges of all societies: poverty, illiteracy, disease and violence. 
We need to remember, however, that welfare values have their origins 
and take their strength from outside the state.  In particular, Judaism and 
Christianity have been foremost among the world-religions in the 
promulgation of welfare values.6    Likewise, it was religious missionaries, 
and not political vanguards, who carried welfare values outside the western 
civilization of the Mediterranean/ European community.  This is as true for 
the United States, with its Quakers,    Lutherans, and its embrace of the 
English Poor Law tradition, as it is of the rest of the Americas, Asia or Africa. 
Likewise, we need to remind ourselves also that welfare values are also 
embedded in the mutual aid obligations of family, neighborhood and 
community members in most of the world's cultures.   One of the first things 
which most immigrant populations did (and do) upon arriving in the 
Americas, for example, is locate one another and form mutual benefit 
societies and associations. 
Welfare Society? 
Full indigenization of welfare values in any society, therefore, is not 
merely a matter of developing comprehensive welfare state coverage.  It is a 
matter of attaining the welfare society.  More than two decades ago, 
Wilensky and LeBeaux suggested the likelihood of a gradual transition from 
welfare state to welfare society.7  However, much like the earlier suggestion 
by Marx of the eventual "withering away" of the state, their comment was 
little more than a passing remark, and no detailed analysis or argument in 
support of this development is offered by them.  In the two decades which 
have passed since their comment was first offered, there has been relatively 
little systematic attention to this idea in social welfare thought.   
The belief that welfare is in some way the exclusive concern or 
preoccupation of the state is one of the most serious fallacies which has crept 
into recent social welfare thought.  Among other things, it has reduced 
American social policy concern in the 1980's to a preoccupation with 
Presidential politics, when Presidents seldom, if ever, have had a positive 
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impact upon American social policy, and President Reagan has proven to be 
no exception.  The "neo-conservative" budget cutting and program reduction 
activities which are attributed to him were already underway prior to 1980, 
and his influence in the domestic social policy arena in other ways has 
probably been grossly exaggerated.   
It is the major thesis of this paper that the world-wide process of 
indigenization of welfare values is not exclusively a process of implementing 
pension, social insurance and other public transfer payment programs and 
regulatory mechanisms governing public health, and personal and economic 
security within the unique legal and political contexts of separate states.  Nor 
is indigenization simply a process of integrating humanitarian values into 
the dominant political culture of each of the world's nation-states.    
The ultimate measure  of the indigenization of social welfare values into 
any of the world's cultures is the integration of welfare values into all of the 
major institutions of that culture.  In the welfare society, not only 
government, but also religion, education, business, leisure, mass 
communication and all other social institutions will reflect the impact of 
welfare values.   
One can see many diverse signs of this trend already in the developed 
countries, whether in the form of "social issue" movies, television, newspaper 
and magazine coverage, the growth of commercial health insurance, or 
religiously organized voluntary social services.  In this respect, the growing 
influence of "privatization" and the expansion of commercial social services in 
the United States probably represents an indigenous response of a 
predominantly business culture to universal welfare values, however much 
American social workers may dislike or distrust this strategy.   
In the "post industrial" world where service industries are supplementing 
or replacing manufacturing industries, one thing seems increasingly clear:  
Expansion of health and welfare services--whether as commercial services for 
middle class clients able to afford them, or occupational welfare "fringe 
benefits" associated with employment--are important emerging forms of 
economic development.   
Human Welfare and Patronage 
Along with growing awareness of the proliferation of welfare societies 
should come increased attention to the domain of voluntary, nonprofit, 
associational and citizen action efforts along this line.  Such efforts have long 
been a stable characteristic of American social welfare. As Kramer and 
other voluntary action scholars have shown, voluntary social welfare activity 
is not limited to the United States, but is also found in the Netherlands, 
Britain, Israel, France, Canada, Japan and many other nations.8  Yoo has 
recently made the case for increased volunteer effort in Korea.9 
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There are many interesting and vital issues of indigenization which are 
opened up for the societies of the Pacific Rim, including Korea, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and others by the prospects for indigenization of welfare 
values associated with voluntary community action.  Given the economic 
growth of this region, however, none is more important than what might be 
termed the indigenization of the principal of patronage.    
For those familiar with the dual uses of this term in American social 
science, I am not referring here to vote buying,  nepotism, controlling 
appointments to political office or other behavior sometimes associated with 
the term political patronage.  I am referring, instead, to the conscious 
cultivation of an indigenous philanthropic tradition in which wealthy 
members of a community voluntarily devote portions of their wealth to 
community improvement, development or betterment projects.   
In the United States, it was the "new rich" of Chicago--particularly the 
wives of meat packers, real estate men, manufacturers and department store 
owners--who underwrote the support of Hull House, and much the same was 
true of the 1,500 other social settlements which developed in the United 
States.  And it was the industrial wealth of steel, railroad, auto, and other 
industries which resulted in the great American foundations which have 
played such an important role--both for good and ill--in American social 
welfare both domestically and internationally.10    
The issue facing the new industrial rich being created all along the Pacific 
rim today is a familiar one:  How is their wealth to be allocated among 
personal consumption, savings and investment, taxation, inheritance, 
philanthropy and other objects?  This is not merely a personal decision.  It is 
an issue of great social importance throughout East Asia today, and one of 
sufficient complexity that it can only be approached indigenously.   
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other rapidly developing Asian 
economic powers may wish to adapt American institutions such as trusts and 
endowments, foundations, fund-raising campaigns and other related 
practices to their own contexts.  Or, they may need to develop completely 
indigenous ways of doing things. 
However, in either case, the advent of the enormous private industrial 
wealth occurring here today makes the question of what form the indigenous 
patronage of these new Asian rich will take.  The issue is probably not 
whether or not such patronage will occur.  Asia, like Europe and the 
Americas, is full of monuments to past patrons.  The real issue is where 
welfare values will fit in the emerging mixture of philanthropic priorities felt 
by these new rich.  Will future Asian industrial philanthropists only build 
fountains, temples and other monuments, and commission works of art?  Or, 
will they also come under the influence of welfare values and also support 
public health, education, and social services?     
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Conclusion 
The future direction of social work in Asia, and the prospects of more 
complete indigenization of this American import rest heavily on the answer 
to that question.  If social welfare values have a direct impact upon the 
future direction of Asian industrial philanthropy, one can expect to see an 
important financial base for voluntary sector social welfare efforts well 
beyond those which currently exist.  On the other hand, if social welfare 
values are ignored or neglected,  the welfare state may be the only viable 
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